Do immigrants have better labor-market outcomes under Democratic governors? By exploiting variations associated with close elections in a regression discontinuity (RD) design applied on gubernatorial elections in 50 states over the last two decades, we find that immigrants are more likely to be employed, work longer hours and more weeks, and have higher earnings under Democratic governors. We present evidence that Democratic governors implement policies which create better labor-market conditions in certain occupations where immigrants are concentrated. Our findings are robust to a number of different specifications, controls, and samples.
Introduction
Immigrants are significantly changing the racial composition of America. For instance, the share of U.S. population that is foreign-born rose steadily from 5 percent in 1970 to 15 percent in 2010, and today there are more Latinos than African Americans (CBO, 2013) . This profound change in U.S. population has major political consequences as well, because immigrants are more Democratic in their party identification and voting preferences (Petrocik, 2009) .
In this paper, we investigate whether immigrants are better off under Democratic rule.
Specifically, we estimate the causal impact of the party affiliations of U.S. governors on immigrants' labor-market outcomes. Using more than 250 gubernatorial elections in 50 states between 1993 and 2013, we address the problem by exploiting random variation associated with close elections in a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Labor-market outcomes are measured by employment status, usual hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, total annual hours, and hourly, weekly, and annual incomes. We find that Democratic governors do not have any impact on white natives, but they have positive and significant impact on immigrants' labor-market outcomes. For example, immigrants (relative to white natives) have a 1.5 percent higher employment rate, and increase their total annual working hours and annual income by 1.8 and 4.2 percent, respectively, under Democratic governors.
Why are immigrants better off under Democratic governors? Several studies have shown that Democrats tend to raise taxes, spend more (on education, health, and infrastructure), increase minimum wages, support labor unions (e.g., Besley and Case, 2003; Reed, 2006; Leigh, 2008; Beland and Oloomi, 2015; Dark, 2001) . Consequently, the main explanation for the above causal impact of the Democratic governors on immigrants may stem from the policies implemented by Democrats that created better job opportunities and conditions in certain occupations and sectors where immigrants are more concentrated. We provide evidence that supports this explanation.
In our sample, the majority of immigrant workers (about 55%) have high school or less education, and about two-thirds of them are construction workers, repair workers, food preparation and serving workers, personal and health care practitioners, teachers, and assemblers and operators. Our analysis shows that restricting the sample to these occupations and controlling for differences in state-level minimum wage, per capita government spending on education, health, and infrastructure, unionization rates, state earned income tax credit (EITC) reduces the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants' labor-market outcomes more than 60 percent. In addition, we find that party affiliation has almost no impact on immigrants' labor markets when the sample is restricted to remaining occupations such as managers and CEOs, architects and engineers, business and financial practitioners, etc.
We also conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis to investigate the robustness of our approach and findings. A particularly important part of our sensitivity analysis is about the validity of the RD design for our analysis. 1 Following Lee and Lemieux's (2014) recommended checklist for implementation of RD designs, we present statistical evidences that strongly support the validity of our approach in the present context. We also show that the main results are robust to using different samples, conditioning variables, and specifications. This paper constructs a new link between immigration and political economy literatures.
The literature on immigration has mainly investigated how immigration has affected different aspects of economies such as labor markets (Hunt and Friedberg, 1999; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2001 and Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) , investment in human capital (McHenry, 2015) , productivity (Peri, 2012) , innovation and technological choice (Hunt, 2010; Lewis, 2011; Peri, 2012) , and prices (Cortes, 2008) . Another strand of the literature investigates the welfare implications of immigration, in particular, its effect on public finances (Alesina et al., 1999; Razin et al., 2002; Preston, 2013) . Our contribution to this literature is to uncover the impact of the political environment on immigrants' labor-market outcomes. This paper also relates to the political economy literature that investigates the impact of political representation on policy outcomes. Although U.S. elected officials have high degree of autonomy to exercise their power in their voting behavior and policy choices, the recent studies have documented that the party affiliation has a significant impact on their actions. 2 In an influential paper, Lee et al. (2004) , using a RD design, find that the party affiliation has a large impact on a legislator's voting behavior. 3 Recent papers find that partisan affiliation of governors matter for policy outcomes. Besley and Case (2003) , using a fixed effect regression analysis for the time period 1950-1998, estimate the impact of the party affiliation of governors on state taxes and expenditures (see also Beland and Oloomi, 2015) . They find that Democratic governors and a higher proportion of seats held by Democrats in the state upper and lower houses is associated with higher state taxes and spending per capita. In a related paper, Reed (2006) shows that tax burdens are higher when Democrats control the governor office and state legislature.
Our paper is related to Beland (forthcoming) who investigates the effect of the party affiliation of U.S. governors on black workers' labor-market outcomes. Employing a RD design on gubernatorial elections between 1977 and 2008, he finds that Democratic governors increase the annual hours worked by blacks relative to whites, which in turn reduces the earnings gap between the two groups. Furthermore, he finds that Democratic governors have a positive impact on employment rates of blacks relative to whites. Our paper differs from his by focusing on the impact of governors' party affiliations on the labor-market outcomes of immigrant workers. One interesting finding in our paper is that introducing immigrants into the analysis does not crowd-out the positive impact of Democratic governors on labor inputs of blacks relative to whites.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the paper and provides summary statistics related to the main features of the data. Section 3 introduces the econometric specification used in our RD design. Benchmark results and the possible channels through which party affiliation can affect labor-market outcomes are also discussed in this section. The robustness of the benchmark results is discussed in Section 4; and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Data Description
The sources of our labor market data are the March Current Population Survey (CPS) files from Integrated Public Use Micro Samples (IPUMS) (2010) for years 1994 to 2014. 4 We consider all people between 18 and 64 years old; and for each person, we record the following characteristics: gender, age, race, marital status, immigration status, citizenship status, education level, employment status, industry, occupation, usual hours worked per week, weeks worked last year, labor income earned last year, and the CPS sampling weights.
We grouped individuals under three races: white, black, and others.
Income variables are deflated using personal consumption expenditure (PCE) index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014) and are measured in 2009-chained prices. 5 After cleaning and correcting, the final sample has about 1.6 million observations over the years . About 82% of individuals are white, 10% black, and 8% other race. Immigrants make around 15% of our sample, and 60% of them are citizen. 4 The time period is dictated by the availability of the data on immigrants. In our sensitivity analysis, we extended our data by including the Census IPUMS 5% extracts for years 1980 and 1990. 5 Top-coded incomes for years 1980, 1990, 1994, and 1995 are multiplied by 1.5; but no correction made for the subsequent years. This is because, starting in 1996, top-coded income values are assigned the mean of all top-coded earners, and these numbers are substantially higher than top-coded income values reported in the previous years. The analysis without top-coded earners yields mostly the same results. Following Autor et al. 2008 , workers with income below $3.35 per hour (in 2009 dollars) are dropped. In addition, to prevent measurement errors related to hours and weeks reported, in each year, the maximum hourly income of workers is limited to the top-coded annual income divided by 2000 (hours per year). In this way, we also prevent part-time workers from having a higher feasible wage than full-time, full-year workers (see Autor et al., 2008) . Our results are not sensitive to such corrections. Observe that the distribution is clustered around the cutoff point with no unusual jumps around it. In addition, the distribution does not show any skewness towards either party.
These observations suggest that candidates did not have any influence on the election results, which is an important assumption for the validity of the RD design. 6 3 Empirical Implementation
Econometric Specification
To determine the impact of party affiliation of U.S. governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes, we use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. To obtain an unbiased estimate of the party effect, one needs to address the endogeneity problem arising from factors such as voter characteristics, party incumbency, labor-market conditions, and so on. Following Lee 2008, this identification problem is solved by exploiting the random variations associated with close U.S. gubernatorial elections.
6 We later formally test this assumption using McCrary's (2008) test.
For any labor market outcome, Y, we estimate the following equation:
where β s and β t denote state and time fixed effects, respectively. In specification (1) 2007 and 2010 . Following Gelman and Imbens (2014 , we assume that Fj(M V ) is a second-order polynomial function. However, considering first-or third-order polynomials yields very similar results. Results are also similar using local linear regression discontinuity (see Section 4). 8 We exclude observations where neither a Democrat nor a Republican won.
worked per week, total weeks worked per year, total annual hours, hourly income, weekly income, and annual income. All variables except for employment status are in logs and are conditional on working. Standard errors are clustered at the state level which enables accounting for potential serial correlation.
Graphical Evidence
As is customary in the RD analysis, we first present some graphic evidence on the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes. Table 2 reports the results based on econometric specification (1). We only report the significant at the 1% level. Similar pattern are observed for black and other races: the corresponding estimates are about 1.9 and 1.2 percents, and are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. The coefficient for natives (captured by the variable Dem) is almost zero (0.2 percent) and is statistically insignificant.
Benchmark Results
Column II presents the impact of Democratic governors on usual hours worked per week based on standard covariates. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are small, positive, and statistically insignificant. As in column I, the coefficient for natives is small (0.4 percent) and statistically insignificant. Consequently, the impact of Democratic governors on usual hours worked per week by any group is insignificant. This conclusion is not surprising because usual hours worked per week are more job specific and less flexible.
Column III reports the results where the labor market outcome is total weeks worked per year. The estimated coefficient on Img×Dem is about 1.7 percent and is statistically significant at the 1% level; and thus, Democratic governors has a positive effect on total weeks worked by immigrants. Similar to column I, the estimated coefficients on Black×Dem and Other×Dem are also positive (2.8 and 1.9 percents, respectively) and statistically significant. The impact of Democratic governors on white natives is positive, small, and statistically insignificant.
Column IV reports the effect of Democratic governors on total annual hours worked, conditional on working. The estimated coefficients are consistent with findings in columns II and III (coefficient for Img×Dem is 1.8 percents and statistically significant at 5 percents).
In sum, the results presented in columns I-IV indicate that Democratic governors have positive and statistically significant impacts on immigrants' labor inputs.
The last three columns present results based on income figures. According to column V, where the dependent variable is hourly income, the estimated coefficient on Img is -20% and is highly significant; i.e., immigrants are earning significantly lower than any other group, as found in the litterature. However, the coefficient on the interaction term Img×Dem is about 4.1 percent and is statistically significant at the 1% level; as a result, Democratic , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
governors have a positive and significant impact on hourly income of immigrants. Note that according to column II, usual hours worked per week by immigrants are not affected by the party allegiance of governors, whereas hourly income is. This suggests that under Democratic governors immigrants have better opportunities to get better paying jobs.
Democratic governors have positive and significant effects on hourly income of blacks, but not on other races. Similar pattern holds when the dependent variable is weekly or annual income (coefficients for Img×Dem are 3.9 and 4.2 percents respectively, and statistically significant at 1 percent).
The impact of Democratic governors on labor inputs (presented in columns I through IV) are similar to those reported in Beland (forthcoming). However, our findings that Democratic governors have a positive and significant impact on hourly and weekly income of black workers are different from his, and our analysis shows that these differences mainly stem from studying different time periods. 9 A comparison of the results in Table 2 with Beland's results further indicates that including immigrants does not crowd out the impact of Democratic governors on the labor market outcomes of black workers.
Possible Channels
In this section, we investigate how Democratic governors can affect immigrants' labormarket outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any policies that Democratic governors targeted for immigrants. However, the Democratic governors might have implemented policies that improve the labor-market conditions in certain occupations and industries where immigrants are more concentrated.
As discussed in the introduction, recent studies have shown that Democratic governors generally raise minimum wages, spend more on education, health, and state infrastructures, and support unions (Besley and Case, 2003; Reed, 2006; Beland and Oloomi, 2015; Dark, 2001) . Applying the RD design to our sample, we also investigate the impact of the party affiliation of the governors on these variables. The results reported in Table 2 ), and in some cases they are statistically insignificant.
For example, total weeks worked and total hours worked are now statistically insignificant.
According to Columns I and VII, the estimated coefficients on Img×Dem are about 50% lower than those in Table 2 .
Which industries and/or occupations are driving the above results? We run regressions in Table 3 10 Although Democrats have strong ties with unions (e.g., Dark, 2001 ), our analysis shows that the impact of the Democratic Party on unionization rate is very small and insignificant. Our finding is consistent with Beland and Unel (2015) who, using individual level data, find that the party affiliation has no impact on union membership.
11 We use occ1990 and ind1990 variables in the CPS files that cover several hundred occupations and industries.
12 Data on government spending on education, health, and highways are available, but we did not include them in the regressions. These series are highly correlated with each other (the coefficient of correlation is at least 0.98) and creating a collinearity problem in our estimations. About 65 percent of immigrants hold occupations listed in Sample 1 (see Table A .2 in the Appendix). Except for health care and teaching occupations, the occupations listed in Sample 1 are mainly held by unskilled workers (i.e., those with high-school or less education). 14 Furthermore, except for farming, food preparation and serving, and personal care occupations, unions are relatively strong in other occupations in Sample 1. As a comparison, the fraction of unskilled workers in Sample 2 is less than 30 percent for both natives and immigrants, and the unionization rate among natives and immigrants is less than 10 percent (see Table A .2). Consequently, one can expect that labor-market outcomes for workers in Sample 1 will be more affected by policies such as minimum wage, spending on infrastructure, and the strong presence of unions. 15
We first present results based on Sample 2 (see Table 4 ). Tables 2 and 3 are mainly driven by occupations listed in Sample 1. Table 2 . However, estimated coefficients on labor inputs are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the ministrative support. Each sample contains about 800,000 individuals. 14 As reported in Table A .2, the fraction of unskilled workers in these occupations is substantially higher among immigrants. For example, 85 percent of immigrants who work in construction are unskilled, whereas 65 percent of natives working in construction are unskilled.
15 Many occupations in Sample 1 are low-wage jobs, and even if individuals working in these occupations are not paid minimum wage, a minimum wage increase still affects the earnings of low-wage workers (see, e.g., Lopresti and Mumford, 2014) . , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
corresponding results in Table 2 are driven by the differences between the two samples (i.e., Sample 1 vs. Sample 2). 
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the benchmark results to a number of different specifications. We begin our analysis evaluating the validity of the RD design in the present context; we then check robustness of the results using different conditioning variables and sample sizes. Finally, we investigate whether the results are driven by a subset of immigrants, i.e., we investigate heterogeneity among immigrants.
Evaluation of the RD Design
In this section, we evaluate the validity of our RD design. The crucial identification assumption in our RD specification (1) is that states where the Democrats barely won are similar to states where the Republicans barely won. We first identify certain characteristics of each state such as proportion of immigrants, growth in overall population, proportion of skilled labor, proportion of blacks in the population. Using each of these characteristics as , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
a dependent variable in an RD regression, we investigate whether the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable that a Democrat won is significantly different from zero. Our regressions indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant, 17 indicating that the aforementioned identification assumption is not violated.
Another important assumption in our RD design is that each candidate has imprecise control over the election result. Since we only observe one election result for each candidate, we cannot directly test the validity of this assumption. One easy way is to look at the histogram of the MV presented in Figure 1 , and see whether there is any unusual jump at the cutoff. According to Figure 1 , we do not observe any unusual jumps. A more formal approach is to use the density test proposed by McCrary (2008) . Figure 2 represents the density function of the MV according to the procedure outlined in McCrary (2008), and there are no unusual jumps around the cutoff. 18
As emphasized by Lee and Lemieux (2014) , one should explore the robustness of the results to a range of orders of the polynomials and a range of bandwidths. In our main specifications, following Gelman and Imbens (2014) , we use a second-order polynomial function for F (M V ). We also considered first-, third-, and fourth-order of polynomial functions. Table A.3 in the appendix, for example, presents results based on the third-order polynomial specification, and its comparison with Table 2 indicate that our results are not sensitive to the degree of the polynomial. 19 We also consider non-parametric regression discontinuity 17 More specifically, for each state characteristics C, we estimate
If states around the discontinuity are similar, one can expect that the estimated coefficient βD must be statistically insignificant. For example, where the dependent variable is the proportion of immigrants, the estimated coefficientβD is −0.0031 with a standard error of 0.0035. 18 We also verified that states where Democrats barely won and states where Democrats barely lost are not statistically different from each other in their pre-treatment covariates. To address the issues raised in Caughey and Sekhon (2011) , using data from Jensen and Beyle (2003) , we found that campaign spending by Democrats across states with close elections are not statistically different. In addition, for close elections to be regarded as random, such elections won by Democratic governors should not be more likely to come with a Democratic House or Senate. We checked and confirmed that those variables are not statistically different when Democrats barely won.
19 The results based on first-and fourth-order polynomial specifications (available upon request) are qualitatively similar. 
Alternative Samples
In this section, we investigate sensitivity of the benchmark results to a number of different specifications of conditioning variables and sample sizes. First, we consider an alternative sample that includes the Census IPUMS 5% extracts for years 1980 and 1990. In addition, the sample covers only full-time, full-year workers (i.e., those who work at least 35 hours per week and forty-plus weeks in a year). With the latter restrictions we wanted to focus on how party allegiance affects immigrant workers with reasonably strong labor-market attachments. Table A .6 in the appendix reports the results based on this alternative sample, and a comparison with Table 2 indicates that the main results remain mostly the same.
The Democratic Party has some conservative members whose political views are similar to Republican counterparts, and they are mainly found in the Southern states. We next investigate the impact of party affiliation on the labor-market outcomes when the Southern states are excluded in the sample. 20 Table A .7 in the appendix reports the results based on this restricted sample, and the results are similar to those reported in Table 2 .
We also considered a case where we exclude states that consistently elect a governor from a single party. In particular, we exclude the states where Democrats and Republicans were in office at least 30% of the time over the period 1993-2013. In addition, we include a dummy for the governor being a woman or from a non-white race. We also control for the party that controls the state House and Senate. The results (available upon request) are similar to those presented in Table 2 . Finally, we also include region specific time effects in our specifications, but the results remain mostly the same.
Heterogeneity Across Immigrants
As indicated in the previous section, about 40% of immigrants are not citizens. How do the party affiliations of governors affect labor-market outcomes of citizen and non-citizen immigrants? We extend specification (1) by replacing the immigration variable with two variables: one for citizen immigrants and one for non-citizen immigrants (denoted by Img c and Img nc, respectively) together with all corresponding interaction terms with the variable Dem and polynomial functions F (M V ). based on this extended model. Note that non-citizen immigrants make substantially less than native, white workers (about 27 percent less). Note further that under Democratic governors the income of citizen immigrants increases by about 2.2%, whereas the income of non-citizen immigrants by about 4.3%. The income differences between these two groups are statistically significant at the 5% level. The impact of Democratic governors on other labor-market outcomes across these groups are largely the same.
We consider heterogeneity among immigrants in two other dimensions as well: skilled vs. unskilled immigrants and female vs. male immigrants. Everyone who has high school or less education is considered as unskilled, and those who have at least some college education are classified as skilled. In our sample, about 55% of immigrants are unskilled. As Table A.9 in the appendix shows, except for "Hours per Week," Democratic governors have a positive and statistically significant impact on labor-market outcomes of skilled and unskilled immigrants. In addition, for each outcome the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms Img s×Dem and Img u×Dem are not statistically different from each other. We obtain qualitatively the same conclusion when we study the impact of the party affiliation on the labor-market outcomes of male and female immigrants (see Table A .10 in the appendix).
Conclusion
Immigration has become a pressing issue for politicians in the U.S., because immigrants have been playing increasingly significant role in the economy and politics. There is a large literature in labor economics that studies the interaction between immigration and labor markets in the U.S. mainly focusing on the impact of immigration on income inequality and unemployment. The literature has also documented that immigrants have lower incomes and higher unemployment rates relative to natives. When it comes to political party preferences, immigrants have overwhelmingly voted for the Democratic party. Naturally one wonders whether immigrants are economically better off under the Democratic Party.
Using more than 250 gubernatorial elections in 50 states between 1993 and 2013, this paper investigated the causal impact of the party affiliations of U.S. governors on immigrants' labor-market outcomes. We implemented a regression discontinuity (RD) design by exploiting the variation associated with close elections. Our analysis shows that immigrants have experienced different labor-market outcomes under the Democratic Party. In particular, we found that immigrants are more likely to be employed, work longer hours and more weeks, and have higher earnings under Democratic governors. We also found that the party affiliation of governors generally has no impact on the corresponding outcomes of white natives.
Our analysis present evidence that Democratic governors implement policies (such as raising sate-level minimum wages, increasing government spending on health, education, infrastructure, providing tax credit for low income people, etc) that create better labormarket conditions in certain occupations where immigrants are concentrated. Our extensive sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to a number of different specifications, controls, and samples. , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
